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TORT LAW-THE LOCALITY RULE IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE LITI­
GATION: AN INAPPROPRIATE METHOD OF DEFINING THE REQUIRED 
STANDARD OF CARE-Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436 
(1986). 
INTRODUCTION 
"Lawyers who handle personal injury cases, work in firms of five 
or fewer[,] ... and have at least [ten] years experience are among the 
most likely targets for malpractice claims."! The majority of these 
malpractice claims allege attorney negligence.2 To recover for their 
negligence claims, clients must prove more than just a bad result. 
They must be able to prove that the attorney's performance did not 
meet the appropriate standard of care, which requires reasonable con­
duct under the circumstances, and that the attorney's failure to meet 
the standard of care caused their injury.3 The standard of care refers 
to a set of criteria used by the trier of fact to determine the adequacy 
of the attorney's conduct.4 One aspect of the standard of care formu­
lation on which many courts disagree is what, if any, geographic limi­
tation should be used to determine the appropriate standard. 5 
1. Marcotte, Suing Lawyers: Malpractice Targets Profiled, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1986, at 
25 (citing findings of American Bar Association's committee on lawyers' professional 
responsibility). 
2. Gates, Lawyer's Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem, 37 
MERCER L. REV. 559, 562 (1986) (Analysis of alleged attorney errors indicates that 70.1 % 
of all claims were for negligence arising from either administrative or substantive errors. 
The remaining claims arose out of client relations or intentional wrongs.). 
3. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 100 (2d ed. 1981). 
4. Id. at §§ 250-51. Criteria important to this determination are "the requisite skill 
and knowledge; the degree of skill and knowledge to be possessed and exercised; the effect 
of local considerations and customs; and any special abilities possessed by the lawyer." Id. 
at §§ 251-52. Examples of standard of care formulations are as follows: "at least that de­
gree of care, skill and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his 
locality," Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244 
(1972); .. 'that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exer­
cised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdic­
tion'.... " Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986) (quoting Cook, 
Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968». 
5. In formulating a standard of care for legal malpractice litigation, courts have not 
agreed on one geographic area which is appropriate for measuring acceptable legal practice. 
The geographic areas chosen range from a local community to the entire nation. See. e.g., 
Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975) (standard 
based upon same or similar locality); Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 4, 5, 325 S.E.2d 757, 
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This note examines the appropriateness of using a geographic lim­
itation to define the standard of care in legal malpractice litigation. 
First, this note discusses the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in 
Russo v. Griffin,6 where the court adopted a state wide standard of 
care7 overruling its prior decisions applying a locality standard.8 This 
section includes an analysis of the rationale used by the Vermont court 
and other courts to overturn the locality rule. The analysis includes 
discussion of (1) the locality standard, (2) the state standard, (3) a 
national standard based upon the legal profession generally, and (4) a 
national standard for the legal specialist. Second, the note analyzes the 
evolution of the standard of care in medical malpractice litigation 
from a locality standard to a general profession standard. The medical 
standard evolution is important in formulating the legal malpractice 
standard because many courts draw an analogy between medical and 
legal malpractice.9 Finally, the note proposes a model standard of 
care which is devoid of any geographic limitation yet includes the cri­
teria important in determining the acceptability of an attorney's 
conduct. 
758 (1985) (standard based on legal profession generally with no reference to a particular 
locality); Ramp, 263 La. at 786, 269 So. 2d at 244 (standard based on attorney's locality); 
Russo, 147 Vt. at 24,510 A.2d at 438 (standard based on attorney conduct throughout the 
state). 
6. 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436 (1986). 
7. Id. at 24, 510 A.2d at 438. 
8. Hughes v. Klien, 139 Vt. 232, 233,427 A.2d 353, 354 (1981) ("The standard for 
legal services, as in other professions, is the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge 
which normally prevails at the time and place."); In re Cronin, 133 Vt. 234, 240, 336 A.2d 
164, 168 (1975) ("The standard of adequacy of legal services as in other professions is the 
exercise of customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place.") 
(quoting Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3rd Cir. 1970». 
9. See, e.g., Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 853, 227 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1976) 
(Georgia requires expert testimony in both legal and medical malpractice to determine 
whether the defendant's conduct is negligent); Dean v. Conn, 419 So. 2d 148, 149 (Miss. 
1982) ("Generally the same standards of professional conduct are applicable to the attor­
ney and physician alike ...."); McCullogh v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 384, 132 A. 102, 103 
(1926) (duty between an attorney and client is the same as between doctor and patient); 
Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 438 (reasoning of courts rejecting the locality rule in 
medical malpractice litigation is applicable to legal malpractice). 
The analogy between medical and legal malpractice may not be as conceptually sound 
as these courts have assumed. There are many differences between the medical and legal 
professions which could be explored to discredit the court's use of the analogy. With this 
limitation in mind, this note seeks only to explore how the analogy has been used to justify 
changes in the standard of care in legal malpractice litigation, and not whether the analogy 
is appropriate. 
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I. Russo V. GRIFFIN 
A. The Facts and Procedural History 
Russo arose when attorney Griffin's client, J. A. Russo Paving, 
Inc., filed suit alleging Griffin's negligence in failing to inform the cor­
poration of the desirability of a non-competition agreement during a 
corporate buy out. to J. A. Russo Paving, Inc. was a family held pav­
ing business in Rutland, Vermont. Joseph Russo incorporated the 
business in 1975 to transfer his interest to his sons, Anthony and 
Frank. 11 Griffin arranged the incorporation, and subsequently all an­
nual meetings were held in his office. 12 
The buyout arrangement occurred when Frank Russo wished to 
sell his interest in the corporation to finance the purchase of a local 
laundromat. 13 Griffin arranged a transfer of Frank's stock to the cor­
poration. The transfer was secured by a $6000 promissory note from 
the corporation which was personally guaranteed by Anthony Russo 
and his wife. 14 
The Vermont Supreme Court summarized Griffin's alleged mis­
conduct in the stock transfer as follows: 
At no time during the meeting did ... Griffin inform the corpora­
tion or Tony Russo, the sole remaining shareholder, of the desirabil­
ity of obtaining a covenant not to compete or explain the 
implications thereof. Three months after the stock transfer, Frank 
went back into the paving business in Rutland in direct competition 
with the plaintiff corporation. A properly drafted non-competition 
covenant would have prevented this from occurring. IS 
During trial, the plaintiff produced two practicing attorneys from 
the Burlington, Vermont area as expert witnesses. They testified that 
"Griffin's failure to exact a covenant not to compete deviated from the 
standard of care required of attorneys practicing in Vermont at the 
time."16 Griffin produced two attorneys from Rutland who testified 
that his failure to recommend a non-competition covenant in the buy 
out of a family member in a closely held business did not deviate from 
the standard of care for Rutland area attorneys.17 The trial court, 
10. Russo, 147 Vt. at 22, 510 A.2d at 437. 
11. Id. at 21,510 A.2d at 436. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 21, 510 A.2d at 437. 
15. Id. at 22, 510 A.2d at 437. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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having to choose between conflicting expert testimony regarding the 
propriety of Griffin's conduct, relied on Vermont's locality rule18 and 
held that Griffin did not breach the standard of care for Rutland attor­
neys and therefore was not negligent. 19 The plaintiff-corporation ap­
pealed the verdict, challenging the trial court's application of the 
locality rule as part of the required standard of care. 
B. The Locality Rule 
The Vermont Supreme Court in Russo faced a challenge to the 
continued validity of a standard of care defined by the locality of the 
attorney's practice.20 The Vermont court adopted the locality rule in 
In re Cronin,21 which involved a prisoner's claim for post conviction 
relief. 22 In Cronin the trial court held that the standard for determin­
ing whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel was 
whether the attorney's conduct amounted to a "mockery of justice."23 
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that" '[t]he standard of 
legal services as in other professions is the exercise of the customary 
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and 
place.' "24 
The Vermont Supreme Court later applied the locality rule to a 
legal malpractice action in Hughes v. Klien. 25 In Hughes, the plaintiff 
filed a small claim action against her attorney for advice allowing the 
release of a spouse's bank records during divorce proceedings. The 
plaintiff claimed that the subsequent cost to photocopy the records 
was unnecessary.26 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's conclusion that the attorney's advice was consistent with com­
munity standards, citing Cronin as authority on the appropriate stan­
18. See supra note 8. 
19. Russo, 147 Vt. at 22, 510 A.2d at 437. 
20. Id. 
21. 133 Vt. 234, 336 A.2d 164 (1975). 
22. Id. at 235, 336 A.2d at 165. The appellant Cronin claimed that his plea of nolo 
contendere was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court ap­
plied an improper standard in determining the acceptability of his attorney's conduct. Id. 
at 235, 336 A.2d at 166-67. 
23. Id. at 238, 336 A.2d at 167 (citing State v. Rushford, 127 Vt. 105, 241 A.2d 306 
(1968); In re Murphy, 125 Vt. 272, 214 A.2d 317 (1965)). 
24. Cronin, 133 Vt. at 240, 336 A.2d at 168 (quoting Moore v. U.S., 432 F.2d 730, 
736 (3d Cir. 1970)). As in Cronin, the issue in Moore was the determination of what consti­
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Moore, 432 F.2d at 732. In adopting the standard for 
legal services, Moore cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A. Id. at 736 n.24. 
25. 139 Vt. 232, 427 A.2d 353 (1981). 
26. Id. at 233, 427 A.2d at 353-54. 
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dard of care formulation. 27 
In overturning Vermont's locality rule, the court in Russo noted 
that the rule developed in the late nineteenth century, in the context of 
medical malpractice litigation, to compensate for the disparity be­
tween medical practitioners in rural and urban areas.28 "'The rule 
was unquestionably developed to protect the rural and small town 
practitioner, who was presumed to be less adequately informed and 
equipped than his big city brother.' "29 Subsequently, courts applied 
the locality rule to legal malpractice litigation, holding that an attor­
ney is required to possess only the skill and diligence ordinarily pos­
sessed by other attorneys in the locality. 3D 
Inclusion of the attorney's locality as a factor in the standard of 
care formulation means the attorney's performance is compared solely 
against other attorneys practicing in that locality.31 This comparison 
results because a locality based standard is commonly phrased as the 
degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge possessed and exercised 
by reasonable attorneys "at the time and place,"32 or "in that local­
ity."33 Courts which apply a locality standard limit the application of 
the competency criteria to attorneys practicing in a certain geographic 
area because they presume that an attorney's conduct is dictated by 
local rules, customs, or practices.34 
27. Id. at 233, 427 A.2d at 354. 
28. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 437. For a discussion of the standard of care in 
medical malpractice litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 98-117. 
29. Id. (quoting Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 193, 
349 A.2d 245, 248 (1975)). 
30. Patterson & Wallace v. Frazier, 79 S.W. 1077, 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (" 'An 
attorney is expected and required to possess such reasonable skill and diligence in all ques­
tions relating to his profession as are recognized by the profession where he practices 
law.' ") (quoting Annotation, Liability ofAttorney to Client for Mistake, 1901 L.R.A. 883, 
893). 
31. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
32. Hughes v. Klien, 139 Vt. 232, 233, 427 A.2d 353,354 (1981); In re Cronin, 133 
Vt. 234, 240, 336 A.2d 164, 168 (1975). 
33. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244 
(1972) ("in his locality"); Dean v. Conn, 419 So. 2d 148, 149 (Miss. 1982) ("in that 
locality"). 
34. Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). Holding that expert 
testimony of an attorney from another county was not competent, the court stated: 
[A]n attorney practicing in a vastly different locality would not be qualified to 
second-guess the judgment of an experienced attorney of the El Paso County Bar 
as to who should be joined as additional party defendants .... The importance of 
knowledge of the local situation is fully demonstrated by the well-recognized 
practice among lawyers of this state in associating local counsel in the trial of 
most important jury cases. 
Id. 
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An effect of applying a locality based standard is that available 
expert testimony necessary to establish attorney negligence will be lim­
ited.35 Expert testimony from other attorneys is essential to the plain­
tiff's case because only an attorney is competent to testify whether the 
defendant-attorney's conduct met the required standard of care.36 
Limiting available expert testimony to that from local attorneys allows 
a locality to set its own standard of care because only local attorneys 
may testify as to what is acceptable legal conduct. In Russo, the trial 
court's reluctance to accept the expert testimony of the Burlington at­
torneys on the appropriate standard of care effectively allowed the 
Rutland attorneys to dictate what was proper conduct in their com­
munity at the time because their testimony was, in effect, uncontra­
dicted. Limiting outside expert testimony also promotes a conspiracy 
of silence because local attorneys are reluctant to testify against each 
other,37 especially in a small community.38 
While some commentators have justified the use of a locality 
based standard when the attorney's alleged negligence involves the ap­
plication of local rules, customs, or practices,39 its application cannot 
be justified when the negligence involves general principles of law.40 
Several jurisdictions, however, including Vermont until Russo, adhere 
to the locality rule41 even though its application may not be justified 
35. In Russo the Vermont Supreme Court noted the effect of the locality rule on 
expert testimony: 
[T]he trial court erroneously applied the locality rule in defining the applicable 
standard of care. This ruling clearly prejudiced the plaintiffs as the court chose to 
accept the testimony of defendants', rather than plaintiff's, expert witnesses on 
the rationale that they were from the Rutland area, and therefore were more fa­
miliar with the applicable standard to [sic] care. 
Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 25, 510 A.2d 436,439 (1986). See also, Cook, 409 S.W.2d at 
478 ("an attorney practicing in a vastly different locality would not be qualified to second­
guess the judgement of an experienced attorney of the EI Paso County Bar ...."). 
36. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 665. 
37. Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 675, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 109 (1960); R. 
MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254 ("The plaintiff may find extreme reluctance 
among local practitioners to testify against a fellow attorney. "). 
38. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254. 
39. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1305 (1963); 
Note, Standard ofCare in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 782 (1967-68); Comment, 
New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. V.L. REV. 408, 417 (1976-77) [hereinafter 
New Developments in Legal Malpractice]. 
40. This note ultimately concludes that a locality based standard is inappropriate not 
only when the attorney's alleged negligence involves general principles of law, but also 
when the alleged negligence involves the application of local rules, customs, or practices. A 
locality based standard is inappropriate because these "local factors" are considered in the 
knowledge portion of the standard of care. For discussion of the model standard of care 
formulation proposed by this note, see infra Section III. 
41. See, e.g., Palmer v. Nissen 256 F. Supp. 497, 501 n.lO (D. Me. 1966) ("The 
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by the importance of local considerations. 
In Russo, the alleged misconduct was attorney Griffin's failure to 
advise his client of the desirability of a non-competition agreement 
during a corporate buyout of a family held business. Advising a fam­
ily held business in this situation is not unique to Rutland, Vermont. 
Attorneys everywhere face similar situations. The standard of care 
dictating the minimum acceptable advice given to a family held busi­
ness structuring a buyout should not vary from locality to locality.42 
A variation in standards is evident when two attorneys from dif­
ferent localities are faced with advising the same type of client under 
the same circumstances. In such a situation, adherence to a locality 
rule prevents the trier of fact from using a uniform standard of care to 
determine if the attorney was negligent, because the attorney's action 
in each locality will be measured against what other attorneys in the 
locality normally do. This, in effect, allows each locality to set its own 
standard of care which means that where the members of the local bar 
are collectively incompetent there will be a low standard of care in 
that locality.43 
Local considerations influencing an attorney's action, which may 
justify the application of the locality rule by the court,44 are lacking in 
parties agree that defendant's duty, as an attorney, to plaintiffs ... must be measured by the 
standards of professional conduct prevailing in the community in which he did his work. "); 
Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. 1983) ("[A] lawyer is required to exercise 
an ordinary and reasonable level of skill, knowledge, care, attention, and prudence common 
to members of the legal profession in the community."); Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 82, 
378 S.W.2d 655, 661-62 (1964) (testimony of local attorney is evidence of the standard of 
conduct for attorneys in that community); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 
La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (1972) ("An attorney is obligated to exercise at least that 
degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his 
locality."); Dean v. Conn, 419 So. 2d 148, 150 (Miss. 1982) ("Both are required to exercise 
that degree of care, skill and diligence which is commonly possessed and exercised by attor­
neys/physicians in that locality."); Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 356, 329 S.E.2d 355, 
366 (1985) (defining the third prong of the standard set out in Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 
517,80 S.E.2d 144 (1954) as follows: "The standard is that of members of the profession in 
the same or similar locality under similar circumstances."); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 
477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (rejecting expert testimony on appropriate conduct under the 
circumstances from an attorney who practiced in a different locality). 
42. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254. ("Although local considerations 
are important, such consideration should not become a means of reducing the standard of 
care or a means of insulating local attorneys. "). 
43. A locality may also set a low standard of care if members of the local bar adhere 
to a customary practice that is considered unacceptable in other jurisdictions. See infra 
note 58 and accompanying text. A higher than expected standard is possible if all members 
of the local bar are extremely well qualified, or if their customary practice exceeds what is 
acceptable in other locales. 
44. See sources cited supra note 41. 
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other jurisdictions applying it. In Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
CO.45 the plaintiffs alleged their attorney was negligent in advising 
them to accept a compromise agreement in settling their father's es­
tate.46 The court in Ramp defined the appropriate standard of care as 
"that degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent 
practicing attorneys in ... [the] ... locality."47 Although the locality 
rule was designed to compensate for the difference in rules and prac­
tices among localities, its application by the Louisiana court was un­
necessary to effectuate that purpose. Considering the attorney's 
locality was unnecessary because the issue in Ramp was not whether 
the defendant misapplied a local rule or ordinance, but rather whether 
the attorney was negligent in failing to advise the plaintiffs of their 
rights under state law before having them sign a compromise agree­
ment. Furthermore, although the court focused on the defendant-at­
tomey's locality and applied the locality rule in determining whether 
the attorney was negligent, the court held the attorney to a minimum 
standard of care applicable to all members of the legal profession who 
advise clients on succession rights, and did not differentiate on the ba­
sis of locality.48 However, by applying a locality based standard, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that a court should focus on 
how local attorneys act under the circumstances and not how a rea­
sonable attorney would act. 49 
The Mississippi Supreme Court also has applied the locality rule 
to determine whether an attorney's actions were negligent even though 
the actions may not have been influenced by local considerations. In 
45. 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972). 
46. Id. at 782-85, 269 So. 2d at 242-43 (Attorney Plotkin advised the heirs to accept 
a compromise agreement which settled the estate without advising them about their rights 
under a forced portion.). 
47. Id. at 786, 269 So. 2d at 244. 
48. Id. at 787, 269 So. 2d at 244 ("According to the expert testimony in this case, 
every lawyer undertaking to advise clients on succession rights must know the basic con­
cepts of forced heirship .... Moreover, even without expert testimony we would necessar­
ily take notice that a legal duty is breached when the attorney fails to recognize such an 
obvious encroachment upon the legitime and to properly advise clients ...."). 
49. In Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 79, 82 (La. App. 1971) 
the Louisiana Court of Appeals defined the standard of care as "that degree of care, skill 
and diligence which is commonly possessed and exercised by practicing attorneys in his 
jurisdiction ...." However, on appeal the Louisiana Supreme Court substituted "locality" 
for "jurisdiction" without any explanation. Ramp, 263 La. at 787, 269 So. 2d at 244. Since 
that decision. Louisiana courts have applied a locality based standard in legal malpractice 
litigation even though the alleged negligence involved other than the application of local 
rules, customs, or practices. See, e.g., Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274, 277 (La. App. 
1977), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1977); Watkins V. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890, 892 
(La. App. Ct. 1973). 
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Dean v. Conn 50 the issue was whether the attorney's inquiry into who 
constituted heirs at law of the decedent's property was acceptable 
when the attorney prepared a title certificate.51 The court stated the 
attorney's conduct was to be judged "in accordance with the knowl­
edge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members 
of the legal profession in Alcorn County, Mississippi."52 However, as 
in Russo and Ramp, the underlying issue did not involve the attorney's 
application of a local rule or ordinance. Rather, the conduct involved 
general legal skills. The fact that the decedent's property was located 
in Alcorn County, as opposed to another county in Mississippi, should 
not have affected the inquiry into how diligent an attorney must be in 
researching and preparing a title. 53 
Application of the locality rule in Dean did not limit the availabil­
ity of local expert testimony because the plaintiff was able to produce a 
local attorney to testify as to the appropriate standard of care.54 The 
locality rule, however, did limit the scope of the expert's testimony 
because the testimony specifically referred to the standard of care used 
by attorneys in Alcorn County while researching and preparing ti­
tles.55 The expert testified, and the jury found, that the attorney did 
not meet the appropriate standard. 56 However, had there been expert 
testimony that attorneys in Alcorn County research and prepare titles 
in the same fashion as the defendant did, and the finder of fact was 
unwilling to find the local practice unreasonable,57 then the alleged 
misconduct would have comported with the applicable standard of 
care, and therefore the attorney would not have been negligent. 
50. 419 So. 2d 148 (Miss. 1982). 
51. Id. at 148. 
52. Id. 
53. See infra note 57. 
54. Dean, 419 So. 2d at 151. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 151-54. 
57. See, e.g., Gleason v. Title Guar. Co., 300 F.2d 813, 814 (5th Cir. 1962), reh'g 
denied, 317 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963). In Gleason, the plaintiff-title insurance company sued 
the defendant-attorney for damages arising from the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's 
certification of clear title. Id. at 813. Although the defendant-attorney gave written certifi­
cation that he had examined personally either the public records or an abstract to deter­
mine clear title, he admitted at trial that he had relied on information given to him over the 
telephone by an abstract company. Id. at 814. The defendant-attorney defended his ac­
tions, arguing "that it was customary in Brevard County, Florida, ... for lawyers to make 
certifications of title as he had done ...." Id. The court rejected the defendant's reliance 
on the local custom, stating: "While custom provides an important indication of what con­
stitutes reasonable care and what is negligent, it is not dispositive of the question at issue. 
All customs are not good customs, and lawyers have no prescriptive right to make know­
ingly false statements in the name of custom." Id. (citation omitted). 
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As the above cases illustrate, the application of the locality rule 
does not always relate to the application of local rules or ordinances 
that affect an attorney's action. The issues facing the attorneys in 
Russo, Ramp, and Dean were legal problems that confront attorneys 
everywhere. The continued adherence to a locality based standard 
hinders the prosecution of legal malpractice claims because it limits 
available expert witnesses. The application of the locality rule also 
allows different results between communities because it allows a local­
ity to set its own standard. The standard set in a particular commu­
nity may be considered unacceptable in other communities or states, 
thus creating a variation among jurisdictions. 58 These deficiencies of 
the locality rule indicate a need for courts or legislatures to formulate 
a standard of care which effectively prescribes acceptable attorney 
conduct under the circumstances regardless of where the attorney 
practices. 
C. The Statewide Standard of Care 
Faced with a challenge to the locality rule, the Vermont Supreme 
Court overruled its prior decisions and adopted a standard of care 
based upon the" 'degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge com­
monly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent 
lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction.' "59 
58. Even under a locality based standard, if the standard of care set by the customary 
actions of local attorneys is too low, then that standard should be rejected by the court. Id. 
A low standard of care set by a locality should be rejected because: 
[n]o group of individuals and no industry or trade can be permitted, by adopting 
careless and slipshod methods to save time, effort or money, to set its own uncon­
trolled standard at the expense of the rest of the community. If the only test is to 
be what has always been done, no one will ever have any great incentive to make 
any progress in the direction of safety. It follows, therefore, that whenever the 
particular circumstances, the risk, or other elements in the case are such that a 
reasonable man would not conform to the custom, the actor may be found negli­
gent for conforming to it .... 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A comment c (1977). 
59. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986) (quoting Cook, Flana­
gan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393,395,438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968)). An intermediate 
standard of care formulation which Russo did not consider is a standard based upon the 
members of the legal profession in the same or similar locality under similar circumstances. 
See. e.g., Smith v. Lewis 13 Cal. 3d 349, 356 n.3, 530 P.2d 589,592-93 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 
621, 624 n.3 (1975). The same or similar locality/situation standard expands the scope of 
the standard beyond the attorney's locality to include those localities where attorneys are 
engaged in similar practice or to include the attorneys who are engaged in the same prac­
tice in similar localities. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1977) 
("The standard is rather that of persons engaged in similar practices in similar localities, 
considering geographic location, size, and the character of the community in generaL"). 
The expanded standard assumes that the legal practice in the similar localities is the same 
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In overturning the locality rule, the court noted that the rule has 
been rejected in medical malpractice litigation because of the immuni­
zation of local practitioners from malpractice liability and a conspir­
acy of silence among potential expert witnesses in the plaintiff's 
10cality.60 In Russo, the defendant-Griffin argued that the reasoning 
used to reject the locality rule in medical malpractice litigation was 
inapplicable to legal malpractice. Griffin claimed the important differ­
ence between legal and medical malpractice is that knowledge of local 
practices, rules and customs is essential to proper legal practice, while 
such local knowledge is not a concern for the medical practitioner.61 
The court, however, rejected that argument.62 
The court agreed with Griffin that "'knowledge of local prac­
tices, rules or customs may be determinative of, and essential to, the 
exercise of adequate care and skill.' "63 However, the court held that 
an attorney's knowledge of local factors did not mandate the contin­
ued application of the locality rule because knowledge of local prac­
tices, rules, or customs is included in the "knowledge" portion of the 
standard.64 Because attorneys in Vermont are required to "familiarize 
themselves with . . . practices, rules, or customs peculiar to their 
area,"65 the Russo court formulated the issue as whether a reasonable 
and prudent attorney would know of the local rule, custom, or prac­
tice and its application.66 
In formulating its standard, the Vermont Supreme Court chose 
and therefore the factors influencing the attorney's action are the same. Smith, 13 Cal. 3d 
at 355 n.3, 358, 530 P.2d at 592-93 n.3, 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 624 n.3, 627 (approving jury 
instructions that the defendant attorney had a duty "to use the care and skill ordinarily 
exercised in like case by reputable members of his profession practicing in the same or 
similar locality under similar circumstances"). The effect of this expanded standard is that 
it allows experts from similar localities to testify on behalf of local plaintiffs. Allowing 
outside expert testimony prevents the immunization of local practitioners from malpractice 
liability and it also breaks the conspiracy of silence. The expanded locality standard, how­
ever, cannot assure the elimination of potentially unacceptable attorney conduct in a local­
ity because, even though it allows outside testimony, the standard of care in the similar 
communities may be the same unacceptable conduct that is being challenged. See infra 
note 110 and accompanying text. 
60. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 438. For a discussion of decisions rejecting the 
locality rule in medical malpractice litigation, see infra section II. For a discussion of 
immunization of local practitioners and the conspiracy of silence in legal malpractice litiga­
tion, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
61. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 438. 
62. Id. 
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the state boundary as a geographic limitation67 because the court 
found persuasive the argument that "the rules governing the practice 
of law do not vary from community to community but are the same 
throughout the state."68 The court also noted that all Vermont attor­
neys must meet the same bar admission standards.69 By selecting the 
state of Vermont as a basis for the standard of care, the court insured 
that all attorneys practicing within the state were subject to the same 
standard of care. 
In Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing70 the Washington 
Supreme Court defined the standard of care for attorneys as one based 
upon the skill and diligence of attorneys practicing within the state.71 
The Washington court, unlike Vermont, did not cite the medical-legal 
analogy as a basis for defining the standard of care for attorneys as one 
that is the same throughout the state.72 Rather, the court cited the 
fact that "the standards of practice for lawyers in this jurisdiction as a 
qualification for the practice of law are the same throughout the state 
and do not differ in its various communities."73 Thus, the Washington 
court recognized that all attorneys in the state should be required to 
meet a minimum standard of care. 
Even though adopting a statewide standard of care eliminates po­
tential differences in the standard between localities within a given 
state, it does not eliminate potential differences in the standard be­
tween states. Also, the limitation of outside expert testimony by a 
statewide standard of care creates the potential for a standard within 
the state which is unacceptable.74 If all Vermont attorneys acquiesce 
67. Id. 
68. Id. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. In comment g, the 
Restatement indicates that allowance for the type of community is "made in professions or 
trades where there is considerable variation in the skill and knowledge possessed by those 
practicing in different localities ... [but in the legal profession] ... such variations either do 
not exist or are not significant." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g 
(1977). 
69. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436,438 (1986). 
70. 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968). 
71. Id. at 395, 438 P.2d at 867 ("the correct standard to which the [attorney] is held 
in the performance of his professional services is that degree of care, skill, diligence and 
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer 
in the practice of law in this jurisdiction"). 
72. The Washington Supreme Court in Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 77, 
431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967), while overturning the use of a locality rule in medical malprac­
tice litigation, stated "[W]e note that the law of this jurisdiction has never recognized a 
difference in the professional competency of a lawyer in a small community from that of the 
professional competency required of a lawyer in a large city." 
73. Cook, 73 Wash. at 395, 438 P.2d at 866. 
74. Although the standard of care may refer to how attorneys in this jurisdiction or 
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in customary practices that may be or are considered unacceptable in 
other jurisdictions and the standard of care is that of a reasonable Ver­
mont attorney, then the testimony by Vermont attorneys regarding 
what is acceptable legal conduct necessarily sets a low standard in the 
state. 
D. The National or General Standard 
The Vermont Supreme Court stopped short of adopting a na­
tional standard of care for legal malpractice litigation because 
"[u]nlike the medical profession, the legal profession has not yet estab­
lished a certification and licensing process which is national in 
scope."75 Justice Hayes, in a separate opinion, agreed that the locality 
standard should be abolished, but advocated in its place a "standard of 
care based upon the legal profession generally."76 Justice Hayes noted 
that doctors in Vermont are subject to a general standard of care based 
upon how a reasonable member of the medical profession would act 
and therefore Vermont lawyers should be subject to a similar 
standard.77 
Justice Hayes supported his argument for a general profession 
standard by noting the national nature of law school training and con­
tinuing legal education programs. 78 He also cited the emergence of 
multistate bar examinations as supporting a general standard, reason­
ing that if candidates for admission to the Vermont Bar must pass a 
multistate bar examination then they should be required to meet more 
than just a state standard of care.79 The general profession standard 
also eliminates potential discrepancies in attorney performance based 
state would act under the circumstances, the customary local practice may be rejected by 
the court as being unreasonable. See supra note 57. 
75. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 25, 510 A.2d 436, 439 (1986) (citing R. MALLEN & 
V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254). 
76. Id. at 25-26, 510 A.2d at 439 (Hayes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
77. Id. at 26, 510 A.2d at 439. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. Presumably, Justice Hayes argues that the use of a multistate bar examina­
tion supports the adoption of a national or general standard of care because the multistate 
exam was designed to provide local bar examiners with a uniform test of legal competence. 
See, Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination-A New Approach, 26 ARK. L. REV. 153, 
155 (1972) ("The philosophy of the multistate bar examination program is to prepare an 
examination which will be adopted and used by the states with the assistance of the 
NCBE."). It is the standardization of the examination that underscores the national stan­
dard argument because initially "[c]onsideration was given to the possibility of regarding 
the new test as a 'national bar examination' so that applicants who pass the test would be 
admitted to practice in all states participating in the program." Id. However, because the 
multistate bar examination is a doctrine-oriented examination and much of a lawyer's daily 
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upon geography. No longer would expert testimony from outside the 
state be excluded as irrelevant to the plaintiff's burden of establishing 
that the defendant-attorney breached the appropriate standard of care 
within the state.80 Eliminating discrepancies in the standard of care 
between states was important to Justice Hayes because he realized that 
standards which resulted in attorney conduct being considered negli­
gent in one state and acceptable in another would lower the public's 
respect for the legal profession.81 
The Georgia Supreme Court in Kellos v. Sawilowsky,82 faced with 
the issue of whether the appropriate standard of care for legal mal­
practice is that of attorneys practicing within the state of Georgia or a 
general profession standard, rejected a geographic limitation and 
adopted a standard of care formulation based upon the legal profes­
sion generally.83 The Kellos court concluded that the standard of care 
required of an attorney is constant regardless of where the attorney 
practices.84 The court did note, however, that for "practicality in 
pleading" the standard was that of the state of Georgia because there 
was no "ascertainable standard of the 'legal . . . profession gener­
ally.' "85 This "practicality in pleading" reference does not affect the 
Georgia court's adherence to a national or general standard because 
the court maintained that expert testimony must be based upon " 'the 
standard of care in the legal profession generally' " rather than that of 
a locality.86 The court held that only the application of the standard 
varies from situation to situation.87 
activities are transaction-oriented, using the existence of the multistate examination to jus­
tify adopting a national standard of care may be subject to criticism. 
80. In his dissent, Justice Hayes pointed out that the state standard of care would 
allow the same conduct under the same circumstances to be considered negligent in New 
Hampshire and acceptable in Vermont. Russo, 147 Vt. at 26, 510 A.2d at 439 (Hayes, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Allowing lawyers from other states to testify as 
experts as to how a reasonable and prudent attorney would have handled the situation 
would eliminate these discrepancies because the inquiry would be how any reasonable at­
torney would have acted and not how attorneys in a particular state would have acted. 
81. Id. This problem may arise even though most, if not all, people may not know or 
care what the required standard of care is for attorneys in their state. Those individuals 
who file a legal malpractice claim only to discover they cannot recover because, while their 
attorney's conduct would be considered negligent elsewhere, it conforms to the local stan­
dard of care, naturally will be critical of the legal profession for "protecting their own." 
82. 254 Ga. 4, 325 S.E.2d 757 (1985). 
83. Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 757-58. 
84. Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758. 
85. Id. at 5-6, 325 S.E.2d at 758. 
86. Id. at 4-5,325 S.E.2d at 757-58 (quoting Storrs v. Wills, 170 Ga. App. 179, 181, 
316 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1984». 
87. Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758. For the Kellos court, these variations in the standard 
occur because the general standard applied in a given case is particularized by "the number 
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The alleged negligence in Kellos was the attorney's failed attempt 
to arrange a silent one-half interest in a corporation for a client.88 The 
attorney's action in Kellos was governed by the Uniform Commercial 
Code, and the application of standard legal principles such as the Uni­
form Commercial Code should not differ depending on the state of the 
attorney's practice. As in Russo, Ramp, and Dean, the attorney in Kel
los was not applying a local rule or practice; rather, the attorney at­
tempted to structure a transaction which was governed by a uniform 
rule applicable throughout the United States.89 An attorney's ar­
rangement of a business transaction which is governed by a uniform 
rule should be judged by how any reasonable attorney would act under 
the same circumstances and not by how Georgia attorneys would act. 
New Hampshire has adopted by statute what appears to be a gen­
eral standard of care for malpractice litigation: 
In determining whether the person against whom a malpractice 
claim has been made has met the applicable standard of care, the 
jury or judge shall not be bound or limited by the standard of care 
accepted or established with respect to any particular geographical 
area or locality, but shall consider only whether the person against 
whom the claim is made has acted with due care having in mind the 
standards and recommended practices and procedures of his profes­
sion, and the training, experience and professed degree of skill of the 
average practitioner of such profession, and all other relevant 
circumstances.9o 
Although no reported decisions specifically hold the statute applicable 
to legal malpractice litigation, other New Hampshire legislation make 
its applicability clear.91 This statute eliminates any reference to a geo­
of options available to the attorney and the amount of time which he has to consider 
them." Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 851, 227 
S.E.2d 802 (1976». The standard is particularized because it is these circumstances that 
are important to the determination of what is reasonable legal conduct. Id. 
88. Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 172 Ga. App. 263, 263, 322 S.E.2d 897, 897 (1984). In the 
original lawsuit the plaintiff alleged there was an oral agreement that she was to be a silent 
stockholder in a corporation through a series of loans repayable in stock. The court ap­
plied provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to assess the validity of the arrangement. 
Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 133, 263 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1980). 
89. Kellos, 245 Ga. at 133 n.2, 263 S.E.2d at 140 n.2. 
90. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:13 (1983). 
91. Id. at § 519-A:2. This section sets up an alternative disposition mechanism for 
professional malpractice claims. In defining the potential claims covered, the statute pro­
vides in part that: 
Any person, or his legal representative, claiming damages by reason of injury, 
death, or monetary loss on account of alleged professional malpractice may infor­
mally and voluntarily submit against any lawyer, doctor, or dentist, against 
410 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:395 
graphic area or locality in determining whether the defendant-profes­
sional has met the applicable standard of care. Instead the statute 
requires the finder of fact to focus on whether the defendant-profes­
sional acted in conformity with the standards of the particular 
profession. 
E. A General Standard for the Legal Specialist 
The Russo court, even though unwilling to adopt a national stan­
dard of care for a general practitioner, indicated a willingness to apply 
a national standard to the legal specialist. 92 The need for uniformity 
in the practice of certain areas of law such as federal income taxation, 
securities law, patent law, and bankruptcy law justified the application 
of a standard devoid of any geographic limitation.93 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Walker v. Bangs,94 recog­
nized a national standard in certain cases when it held that a Califor­
nia lawyer could testify in a Washington court regarding the proper 
standard of care for prosecuting a federal maritime claim.95 A territo­
rial limitation on expert testimony in Walker was unnecessary because 
it involved a federally created claim governed by the substantive rules 
of maritime law and the federal rules of evidence and civil proce­
dure.96 As the Walker court noted, if defendant-attorneys hold them­
selves out as "specialists" then they should be judged against others 
who practice in the same field regardless of their locality.97 
whom he believes there is a reasonable basis for a claim to a hearing panel prior to 
the institution of any litigation as to said claim, and not thereafter. 
Id. Another section of the chapter setting out the alternative disposition mechanism is 
entitled "Locality Rule Inapplicable" and contains the exact language of N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 508:13 except that "hearing panel" is substituted for "jury or judge." N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 519-A:7 (1974). It is clear, then, that the New Hampshire Legislature has 
abolished the application of the locality rule when a plaintiff presents a legal malpractice 
claim to the hearing panel. Therefore, because of the almost identical language in 508: 13 
and 519-A:7, it is likely that the locality rule is also inapplicable when a plaintiff elects to 
pursue actual litigation. Also, the New Hampshire Legislature made it clear that a general 
standard of care should be applied to determine what constitutes professional negligence. 
92. Russo, 147 Vt. at 25,510 A.2d at 439. 
93. Id. 
94. 92 Wash. 2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279 (1979). 
95. Id. at 857, 601 P.2d at 1282. In allowing expert testimony from an out of state 
attorney, the court noted "the fact that Allan Brotsky is not licensed to practice in this 
state should go to the weight, not the admissibility of his testimony ...." Id. at 859, 601 
P.2d at 1282. Arguably, a court's indication that the fact that an attorney-witness is from 
outside the state affects the weight of his or her testimony may be infusing considerations of 
locality back into the general standard. 
96. Id. at 859, 601 P.2d at 1283. 
97. Id. at 860, 601 P.2d at 1283. 
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Because of the similarity in the standard of care formulation for 
legal and medical practitioners,98 analyzing the evolution of the medi­
cal standard from a strict locality to a general profession standard is 
important to the discussion of the evolution of the legal malpractice 
standard.99 
The early medical malpractice cases applied a standard of care 
which focused on the locality of the physician's practice. loo Courts 
considered the physician's locality important because "[i]n the smaller 
towns and country, those who practice medicine and surgery, though 
often possessing a thorough theoretical knowledge of the highest ele­
ments of the profession, do not enjoy so great opportunities of daily 
observation and practical operations ... as those have who [sic] reside 
in the metropolitan towns ...."101 The distinction between the rural 
and urban physician meant the rural physician "should not be ex­
pected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical knowledge 
possessed by those having greater facilities for performing and witness­
ing operations."102 
Courts expanded the locality rule in the late nineteenth century to 
include similar communities because its application "effectively immu­
nized from malpractice liability any doctor who happened to be the 
sole practitioner in his community."103 The North Carolina Supreme 
98. See supra note 9. 
99. The evolution of the medical standard served as a basis for the Russo court to 
expand and change the legal malpractice standard in Vermont. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 
20, 23, 510 A.2d 436,438 (1986). 
100. See, e.g., Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 289-90 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 
Kan. 46, 62-64 (1870); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880). 
101. Tefft, 6 Kan. at 63-64. 
102. Id. at 64. See also Smothers, 34 Iowa at 289-90 ("It is also ... true that the 
standard of ordinary skill may vary even in the same state, according to the greater or 
lesser opportunities afforded by the locality, for observation and practice, from which alone 
the highest degree of skill can be acquired."). The court in Small stated: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that a physician in a small country village 
does not usually make a specialty of surgery, and, however well informed he may 
be in the theory of all parts of his profession ... [h]e would have but few opportu­
nities of observation and practice in that line such as public hospitals or large 
cities would afford. 
Small, 128 Mass. at 136; Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall a/the Locality Rule in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 412 (1969) (The early locality nile com­
pensated for the disparity of educational and training opportunities between the rural and 
urban medical practitioner.). 
103. Waltz, supra note 102, at 411. 
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Court in McCracken v. Smathers 104 recognized the potential immuni­
zation of doctors: 
The degree of care and skill required is that possessed and exercised 
by the ordinary members of his profession .... It cannot be mea­
sured simply by the profession in the neighborhood ... [because] 
... '[n]eighborhood' might be construed into a very limited area 
.... It might contain but few dentists ... [and] ... [b]oth might be 
men of very inferior qualifications, and to say that they may set 
themselves up as the standard of a learned profession, and prove the 
standing of each by the ability of the other, would be equally unjust 
to the profession and to its patients. 105 
The medical malpractice standard of care has evolved in many 
jurisdictions to exclude reference to the physician's locality.106 The 
104. 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898). 
105. Id. at 803, 29 S.E. at 355. 
106. See. e.g., Green v. U.S. 530 F. Supp. 633, 642 (D. Wis. 1982) ("degree of skill 
usually exercised by the average practitioner acting in the same or similar circumstances"); 
aff'd, 709 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1983); May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 600 (Ala. 1982) ("The 
language 'same general neighborhood' refers to the national medical neighborhood or na­
tional medical community, or reasonably competent physicians acting in the same or simi­
lar circumstances."); Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1980) ("[W]e are inclined to 
view that Alabama's 'same general neighborhood' rule does in fact encompass a national 
standard of care for reasonably skilled physicians acting in the same or similar circum­
stances ...."); Sikorski v. Bell, 167 Ga. App. 803, 805, 307 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1983) ("The 
standard of care for physicians ... is not for the particular locality or community where the 
tort was committed but the standard of care considered by the profession generally to rep­
resent a reasonable degree of care and skill." (citations omitted)); Shilkret v. Annapolis 
Emergency Medical Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,200, 349 A.2d 245,253 (1975) ("We ... 
hold that a physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is expected 
of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the 
same or similar circumstances."); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 
798 (1968) ("The proper standard of care is whether the physician ... has exercised the 
degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the ad­
vances in the profession."); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 254, 180 N.W.2d 788, 791 
(1969) ("geographic conditions, or circumstances control neither the standard of a special­
ist's care nor the competence of an expert's testimony"); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 
871 (Miss. 1985): 
In the care and treatment of each patient, each physician has a non-delegable 
duty to render professional services consistent with that objectively ascertained 
minimally acceptable level of competence he may be expected to apply given the 
qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself out as possessing and given 
the circumstances of the particular case. 
King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 482, 279 S.E.2d 618,620 (1981) ("Having reconsidered and 
examined the viability of the 'locality rule' in South Carolina today, we hereby discard this 
rule and adopt a standard of care not bound by any geographic restrictions."); Farrow v. 
Health Seh. Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1979) ("that degree of skill and learning 
ordinarily possessed and exercised, under similar circumstances, by other practitioners in 
his field of practice"); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 
(1967) ("No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the standard of care which a 
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Maryland Court of Appeals in Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Medi­
cal Hospital Association 107 responded to changes in the medical profes­
sion by adopting a national standard of care rejecting not only the 
locality rule, but also the similar locality rule. lOS The court rejected 
the similar locality rule because although it allows experts from other 
communities to testify as to what is acceptable conduct, there is still 
the potential for an unacceptable standard of care. This unacceptable 
standard may arise because the standard in the other communities 
may be the same standard of care as that being chailenged. 109 The 
court in Shilkret adopted a national standard because: 
[w]hatever may have justified the strict locality rule fifty or a hun­
dred years ago, it cannot be reconciled with the realities of today. 
'New techniques and discoveries are available to all doctors within a 
short period of time through medical journals, closed circuit televi­
sion presentations, special radio networks for doctors, tape recorded 
digests of medical literature, and current correspondence courses.' 
[Citation omitted.] More importantly, the quality of medical school 
training itself has improved dramatically in the last century . . . . 
[T]here now exists a national accrediting system which has contrib­
uted to the standardization of medical schools throughout the 
country. 110 
Just as the medical standard responded to changes in the medical 
profession, the standard of care in legal malpractice has responded to 
changes within the legal profession. 1 1 I However, evolution of the 
standard of care for legal malpractice from a strict locality to a na­
tional standard has been slower. This resistance to change stems from 
the presumption that "local considerations" are more important to the 
legal standard than they are to the medical standard. 112 However, the 
medical doctor or dentist must meet solely to the practice or custom of a particular locality, 
similar locality, or geographic area."); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283-84, 206 
N.W.2d 166, 174 (1973) ("that degree of care and skill which is exercised by the average 
practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances"). 
107. 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245, 248 (1975). 
108. Id. at 196, 199, 349 A.2d at 250, 252. 
109. Id. at 196, 349 A.2d at 250. 
110. Id. at 194, 349 A.2d at 249 (quoting Note, An Evaluation 0/ Changes in the 
Medical Standard o/Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729, 732 (1970)). 
Ill. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 25, 510 A.2d436, 438-39 (1986). The Russo court 
cited specialization as one factor that would support a national standard in some areas of 
practice. Id. at 25, 510 A.2d at 439. Also, the court cited the fact that the legal profession 
has yet to establish a national certification and licensing process similar to the medical 
profession as the reason for rejecting a national standard. Id. However, the court's lan­
guage indicates that if the legal profession adopted a national certification and licensing 
process, the Vermont court may be willing to change the standard of care in response to it. 
112. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985). In rejecting the 
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existence of local factors, such as rules, practices, or customs, should 
not arbitrarily define the required standard of care in legal malpractice 
litigation by limiting the inquiry of proper conduct to a particular geo­
graphic area. 113 Instead, these local factors should be incorporated 
into the standard of care. 
Although the Russo court used the medico-legal malpractice 
analogy as one reason to reject the locality rule in legal malpractice 
litigation, 114 it was not the court's sole rationale for changing the stan­
dard. The court also observed that "[i]n Vermont, the rules governing 
the practice of law do not vary from community to community but are 
the same throughout the state."115 The court also noted that Vermont 
bar admission standards require that all attorneys wishing to practice 
in the state successfully meet established admission standards. I 16 
A geographic limitation on the standard of care can protect attor­
neys from being second-guessed on the application of local law by 
those who are unfamiliar with it. Another, less justifiable reason may 
be that the local bar has a "club" atmosphere and distrusts the inter­
ference of "outsiders." However, a standard of care formulation with­
out any geographic limitation yet incorporating all relevant local 
factors would offer the same "protection" as the locality rule without 
the adverse side effects of immunizing local practitioners or promoting 
a conspiracy of silence. 
III. A MODEL STANDARD OF CARE 
A. The Model Standard Defined 
A comprehensive standard of care should incorporate the criteria 
necessary to determine the adequacy of the attorney's conduct in a 
particular situation. 117 Richard E. Mallen and Victor B. Levit, in 
their book Legal Malpractice,118 succinctly incorporate the necessary 
criteria into a "standard of competence" that is devoid of any geo­
graphic limitation: "the attorney should exercise the skill and knowl­
locality rule in medical malpractice litigation, the Mississippi Supreme Court implied that 
it would continue to adhere to the locality rule in legal malpractice litigation. The court 
stated: "common sense and experience inform us that the laws of medicine do not vary 
from state to state in anything like the manner our public law does." Id. at 870. For a 
discussion of Mississippi's locality rule for legal malpractice litigation, see supra notes 50­
57 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 44-58. 
114. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23-25, 510 A.2d at 437-38. 
115. Id. at 24, 510 A.2d at 438. See also supra notes 71-73. 
116. Id. 
117. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
118. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3. 
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edge ordinarily possessed by attorneys under similar circumstances." 119 
Under the Mallen and Levit standard, however, "[c]onsiderations 
of locality, custom and special skills are treated as the 'similar circum­
stances.' "120 Mallen and Levit include "locality" as a similar circum­
stance because they treat it as a form of specialization,121 which arises 
when the attorney is knowledgeable of local considerations, such as 
local rules, practices, and customs, which may be essential to a client's 
representation. 122 If the malpractice claim is based on an attorney's 
misapplication of a local practice or rule, then the question under a 
general standard of care would be whether a reasonable attorney 
would know of the rule or custom's existence and its practical 
applications. 123 
Although Mallen and Levit do not advocate abolishing the local­
ity rule,124 the standard of competence they advocate provides a useful 
model for courts to follow. The similar circumstances aspect of the 
model allows a judge to define the applicable standard of care for the 
jury, using the specific facts of the litigation. 125 Utilizing this model, 
the appropriate standard of care formulation in Russo would be: 
Attorney Griffin should have exercised the knowledge and skill or­
dinarily possessed by attorneys advising a family held business on 
how to structure a corporate buyout when one of the parties wishes 
to sell his or her interest in the corporation in order to start a new, 
but different, business venture in the same community. 
This formulation is an objectively based standard which incorpo­
rates all of the relevant factors that should have influenced attorney 
Griffin's advice. The model standard determines acceptable legal con­
duct by comparing Griffin's conduct, not with that of other Rutland 
area attorneys, but rather with the conduct of any reasonable attorney 
in similar circumstances. 126 
119. Id. at § 251 (emphasis in original). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at § 254. 
122. Id. Arguably, considering the attorney's locality in this manner may infuse a 
geographic limitation into the general standard of competence. 
123. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986). 
124. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254 ("As with specialization, the 
erosion of local standards should be approached cautiously, aware of the practical conse­
quences of change and only on a case by case basis."). 
125. Id. at § 251 n.15. 
126. By eliminating reference to the attorney's locality, the model standard of care 
may make the "local or customary" standard a risky and unreliable guide by which an 
attorney may gauage his or her conduct. Arguably, a national or general standard of care 
may not be certain enough to provide attorneys with a prospective guide by which they 
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B. The Rationale for the Model Standard 
The model standard has a number of advantages. Its focus on 
how a reasonable attorney would act under similar circumstances per­
mits expert testimony regarding acceptable conduct from attorneys 
who practice outside the locality. This outside expert testimony pre­
vents the immunization of local practitioners from malpractice liabil­
ity because, although the inquiry remains a question of fact,127 the 
model focuses on the circumstances that affected the attorney's deci­
sion and not the location of his or her practice. 
The model also promotes consistency. Under a locality rule, con­
duct may be considered negligent in one state and under exactly the 
same circumstances be considered acceptable in another, because each 
state restricts expert testimony to local attorneys.128 The model pre­
vents this inconsistency because, although many expert witnesses will 
still be from within the general area of the defendant's practice, 129 the 
trier of fact will not be predisposed to disregard the out of state ex-
may structure their conduct. Although this desire for a prospective guide is justifiable, our 
tort system traditionally has been reactive in defining what is considered negligent conduct. 
See supra note 57. Even though a state standard of care may provide more guidance for 
local attorneys through state bar journals and 10caIly conducted continuing legal education 
programs, this note advocates a national or general standard to avoid the situation where 
the same conduct is considered negligent in one state and acceptable in another. Further­
more, looking to other local attorneys or the state bar may not be adequate because the 
majority of legal malpractice claims involve the basic principles of good legal practice to 
which all attorneys should adhere, regardless of the location of their practice. For example, 
Attorney William Gates explains that: 
The information derived from the reports on errors is given more analytical sig­
nificance by grouping the aIleged errors under the foIlowing broad headings: Ad­
ministrative errors, substantive errors, client-relations errors, and 'intentional' 
wrongs. This approach shows that 26.3% of the claims are made because of ad­
ministrative matters such as calendaring, lost files, procrastination, and clerical 
error. Substantive errors result in 43.8% of the claims with the greatest errors 
consisting of the following: Failure to know or properly apply the law, inade­
quate investigation, planning error, and failure to know about a deadline. Client 
relations errors, such as failure to obtain consent or inform client, failure to fol­
low client's instructions, and improper withdrawal, result in 16.2% of the claims. 
Intentional wrongs, such as abuse of process, fraud, and civil rights violations, 
make up 11 % of all claims. 
Gates, supra note 2, at 562. 
127. Because the inquiry remains a question of fact, expert testimony generally will 
still be required to provide the trier of fact with a standard by which to judge the defend­
ant-attorney's conduct. Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. 597, 598, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 
1170 (1981) (Expert testimony is required unless "the claimed legal malpractice is so gross 
or obvious that laymen can rely on their common knowledge or experience to recognize or 
infer negligellce from the facts. "). 
128. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
129. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 667. ("Both parties prefer to obtain 
a local expert of sufficient reputation so as to impress or be known by the jury."). 
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perts' testimony simply because they are from a different 10cale. 130 
Because it focuses on reasonable conduct under the circum­
stances, the model standard of care does not prejudice general practi­
tioners by subjecting them to a standard which compares their 
conduct to that of a legal specialist. 13l While the use of specialists as 
experts raises a concern that they will become "hired guns" for plain­
tiffs and thereby raise the standard of care, this concern may be over­
stated. The model standard of care necessarily will be defined by the 
facts of the litigation. For example, an attorney who specializes in 
stock transfers may not be a universally competent witness to testify 
regarding what advice a reasonable attorney would give a small closely 
held family business structuring a stock transfer between relatives. A 
specialist could testify only if he or she is experienced in similar situa­
tions or is familiar with what is considered appropriate advice under 
the circumstances. Also, the expert's testimony will not relate to how 
he or she would have advised the client but to how a reasonable attor­
ney would advise the client under the specific circumstances. 
Defining the standard of care by the circumstances of the case 
also makes the state boundary limitation unnecessary. If the attor­
ney's conduct giving rise to the malpractice suit involves the applica­
tion of a local or state substantive or procedural rule, then that 
"circumstance" would necessarily limit the available experts to those 
attorneys who are familiar with the rule.132 In this situation, the out 
130. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 22, 510 A.2d 436, 437 (1986) ("The court ulti­
mately chose to accept the testimony of defendant's, rather than plaintiff's, expert wit­
nesses on the premise that 'those attorneys whose practice primarily was conducted in the 
Rutland area. . . are more familiar with the standard of care. . . required of lawyers.' ") 
(quoting the trial court's findings of fact). 
131. However, there may be circumstances where a reasonable general practitioner 
would not handle a case because of its sophistication and therefore would have a duty to 
refer the client to a specialist. Home v. Peckman, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 414-15, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 714, 720 (1979); Russo, 147 Vt. at 25, 510 A.2d at 439. If the general practitioner 
fails to refer a client to a specialist and is allegedly negligent in handling the case, then that 
attorney should be held to the standard of care of attorneys specializing in the particular 
field. To hold the general practitioner to a different standard of care deprives the client of 
an assurance of reasonable representation under the circumstances. 
132. If the alleged negligence is the attorney's misapplication of a procedural or sub­
stantive rule, then the issue would be how a reasonable attorney would have applied the 
rule. Attorneys who are familiar with the rule or a similar rule's application would be 
competent to testify. If the alleged negligence is the attorney's unawareness of the rule, 
then the issue would be whether a reasonable attorney would have become familiar with the 
rule before representing the client. Any attorney would be competent to testify whether a 
reasonable attorney would investigate the matter before representing a client. Also, even 
though the statute of limitations for a particular claim may vary from state to state, any 
attorney would be competent to testify that it is a breach of the attorney's professional duty 
to allow a statute of limitations to run, thereby barring a client's claim. 
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of state attorney inexperienced with the rule or its application is not a 
competent witness. 
The Russo court stated that certain areas of substantive law­
those that concern "national law" where "[i]t would be. . . inappro­
priate to have different standards of care in the practice of ... [these 
areas] from state to state"133-lend themselves to a general standard of 
care. 134 However, other non-national substantive areas of law such as 
tort and contract are also based upon general legal principles which 
cut across jurisdictional boundaries.135 It may be inappropriate for 
the standard of care regarding these general principles of law to vary 
from state to state. 136 The model standard facilitates the adoption of a 
standard which is national in scope yet fair to the local bar, because it 
limits expert testimony to attorneys familiar with legitimate local dif­
ferences. The expert is also familiar with the particular area of prac­
tice involved in the malpractice litigation.137 
The model also provides courts with a standard of care formula­
tion that allows for comprehensive jury instructions. By defining the 
issue in terms of how a reasonable attorney would act under the cir­
cumstances of the case, the court gives the finder of fact a standard by 
which to evaluate conflicting expert testimony. 138 Utilizing the model 
standard to formulate jury instructions and to determine the accepta­
bility of the defendant-attorney's conduct under the circumstances of 
the case is the same task that society imposes on the judicial system in 
any negligence claim. 
133. Russo, 147 Vt. at 25, 510 A.2d at 439 ("federal taxation law, securities law, 
patent law, and bankruptcy law"). 
134. Id. 
135. In designing the multistate bar examination, the National Committee of Bar 
Examiners chose contracts, criminal law, evidence, real property, and torts as substantive 
areas of law that could be tested on a national scale. Covington, supra note 79, at 154. 
136. Even though some legal principles, such as comparative versus contributory 
negligence, may vary from state to state, the appropriate conduct of an attorney practicing 
in a comparative negligence state necessarily should not be measured solely against other 
attorneys practicing in that state. The question should be how a reasonable attorney would 
act under the circumstances, one of the circumstances being that the jurisdiction applies 
comparative negligence principles. If the attorney from a comparative negligence jurisdic­
tion represents a client in a jurisdiction applying contributory negligence principles, the 
question remains how a reasonable attorney would act under the circumstance of being in a 
contributory negligence jurisdiction. Holding the out of state attorney to the same stan­
dard of care is necessary to protect a client from the attorney's ignorance of the foreign law. 
New Developments in Legal Malpractice, supra note 39, at 420-21. 
137. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 251 n.15. 
138. See supra pages 404-07 for the formulation of the standard of care applicable in 
Russo. 




Russo v. Griffin is a step in the right direction. The Vermont 
Supreme Court realized that the locality rule in legal malpractice liti­
gation is no longer justified. However, the court's focus on the anal­
ogy to the evolving standard of care in medical malpractice litigation 
is unfortunate; the court was unwilling to adopt a "national or gen­
eral" standard until the legal profession adopts a national certification 
and licensing process similar to that of the medical field. 139 
An analysis of the rationale for the locality rule indicates that any 
geographic limitation is inappropriate in defining the required stan­
dard of care. The issue for the trier of fact should be whether the 
attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances and not whether 
his or her actions conformed with how other local attorneys act. A 
locality rule unnecessarily limits available expert witnesses, potentially 
insulates local attorneys from liability, and promotes a conspiracy of 
silence. Defining the standard of care in terms of what is reasonable 
conduct under the specific circumstances of the case eliminates these 
deficiencies of the locality rule while providing a minimum standard 
which all attorneys must meet. 
The model proposed by this note provides a standard which is fair 
to both the legal profession and the public. Attorneys are assured that 
their conduct will be judged only against other attorneys facing similar 
circumstances, while members of the public are assured that attorneys 
who represent them will be held to the standard of reasonable attorney 
conduct under the circumstances of each case and not exclusively how 
local practitioners usually have handled the matter. 
John R. Skelton 
139. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
